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 1 
Phase II Report on Intelligent Software Decoys: 
Intelligent Software Decoy Tools for Cyber 
Counterintelligence and Security Countermeasures 
 
 
Summary of Research Results 
 
During the Phase II of the Intelligent Software Decoys Project, we accomplished the 
following: 
• Created a set of case studies of intrusions and countermeasures in support of 
developing fundamental principles of countermeasure strategies, completing our 
first draft of the high-level language for specifying intrusions and 
countermeasures, and implementing the first complete prototype of our tool that 
automatically compiles these specifications into executable code. 
• Formulated both a taxonomy and fundamental principles of countermeasure 
strategies based on the runtime and setup resources needed to complete the coun-
termeasures.  We researched psychological, legal, social, and other aspects of de-
coy deployment.  We further developed our theory of counterplanning for formu-
lating the most effective set of decoy tactics (i.e., ploys) for a given situation.  The 
theory is based on artificial-intelligence planning methods for discrete plans to 
model possible attacker scenarios.  The theory encompasses analysis of potential 
perturbations of the aforementioned plans to find the most disruptive ones, with 
the aim of constructing a detailed counterplan that optimizes the tradeoff between 
disruption and ability to deceive the attacker based on plausibility of the ploys 
used. 
• Wrote the first draft of the high-level language for specifying intrusions and 
countermeasures.  The language is based on the notion of a precise model of the 
behavior of software systems.  This language includes the abstract notions of 
composite event patterns, aggregate events over events, computations over event 
traces, probes, and primitives for specifying countermeasures such as different 
types of delays, substituting system calls by predefined decoys, and dynamic 
counter-plan responses. We left to further research investigation of temporal 
monitoring tools, currently used for the verification of complex reactive systems, 
for use in detecting patterns of intrusions. 
• Implemented the first complete prototype of the tool that will automatically 
compile high-level specifications of decoys into executable code.  The tool 
generates target code for the wrapper-generation tool developed by NAI Labs.  
The prototype is hosted on a platform running the Linux operating system, 
although the NAI Labs tool provides support for many commonly used operating 
systems. 
• Constructed a learning module for the Naval Postgraduate School Homeland 
Security Leadership Development Program’s curriculum for the Homeland 
Defense specialization of the Master of Arts degree in National Security Affairs.  
This component of our research is reported in Technical Report NPS-CS-04-005. 
 
In the remainder of this report, we discuss our accomplishments in more detail. 
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A theory of deception in information systems  
 
Deception is a key feature of human social interaction not much studied in either 
information security or artificial intelligence.  In one part of this project, we are 
developing testable computational models of deception including the major sub-
phenomena or trust, expectation, suspicion, surprise, deception plans, and manufactured 
patterns (Bell & Whaley, 1991).  Such a theory can be used to explain both offensive 
deceptions (to gain some advantage) and defensive deceptions (to foil someone else's 
plans).  Defensive deception could fool attackers into thinking our systems are not worthy 
of attack, or thinking incorrectly they have hurt us.  It can be very convincing because 
people expect computer systems to be obedient servants.  Paradoxically, deception 
against bad people can increase the trust level of good people, much like how an 
inquisitive police force increases social trust.  Deceptions can also produce useful side 
effects like identification of the attacker by planting phone numbers we can trace or 
installing "spyware" on the attacker that will report their activities.  
 
Producing a convincing defensive deception requires careful planning because people can 
easily recognize patterns suggesting it.  So deception needs to be applied sparingly and 
thoughtfully based on a theory of trust and "suspiciousness" and its psychological 
consequences (Miller & Stiff, 1993).  We are exploring applying it in two different ways.  
One will use a theory of "generic excuses" that will frustrate the attacker but appear to be 
highly plausible.  The other way will use a theory of "counterplanning" that will frustrate 
the attacker in highly effective but hard-to-notice ways.  Counterplanning can make use 
of artificial-intelligence planning research but has unique issues too. 
 
We must be careful not to apply deceptions to non-malicious users who accidentally act 
suspicious; thus intrusion-detection systems need to search for consistent patterns in 
lower levels of suspiciousness, a different set of criteria than employed today.  Deception 
also raises ethical issues to be explored.  In general, deception is judged ethical against 
serious consequences (e.g. destruction of a computer system in an attack) which may 
apply to cyberterrorism (Tan, 2003). 
 
One part of our research on the theory of deception (Rowe and Rothstein, 2004) looked at 
the classic deception methods of conventional warfare: concealment, camouflage, ruses, 
demonstrations, feints, false and planted information, lies, displays; and insight.   Of  the 
nine, concealment and camouflage of operations (as opposed to data) are difficult in 
cyberspace since so much of it is black and white: Either a file exists or not.  Then 
domain name servers are quite willing to tell adversaries about what resources exist.  
Ruses are not helpful in cyberwarfare because identity theft is easy and lacks surprise.  
Demonstrations are hard to make convincing and likely counterproductive since shows of 
strength encourage attacks which cannot be defended.  Feints are not helpful because it is 
so difficult to localize an enemy for a counterattack in cyberspace.   False and planted 
information such as posting fake attack methods on hacker bulletin boards is certainly 




This leaves lies, displays, and insights as potential defensive tactics.  Moreover, they are 
powerful tactics just beginning to be explored.  Outright lies by an information system 
can be effective because users are so accustomed to truth from their systems.  The system 
could lie about completing a download of a suspicious file or give a false excuse as to 
why it cannot.  Or lies could be integrated into an overall "display" for the attacker.  An 
example would be simulating an infection by a virus while actually destroying the 
infection.  "Insights" would be the next step, where a set of lies and displays could be 
integrated into an overall defensive strategy designed to cause the attacker the maximum 
amount of trouble, using methods from artificial intelligence.  (Cohen, 1999) gives an 
interesting further taxonomy of deception methods. 
 
Implementation of automatic deceptions and deception planning 
 
We have implemented several demonstration systems for deceptive software.  One was a 
Web browser that delays answering requests when it suspects it is under attack (Julian et 
al, 2003).  Another was a file-transfer utility that pretends to succumb to a well-known 
buffer-overflow attack (Michael, Fragkos, and Auguston, 2003). 
 
Another was a demonstration Web site including a number of deceptive practices.  The 
site looks like a file directory hierarchy (see Figure 1); users can click on names of 
directories to see subfiles and subdirectories with fake dates and sizes, and can click on 
names of files to see captioned image data.  Some of the files appear to be encrypted like 
that on the top right of Figure 1.  Authorization errors are issued for some other files, and 
loading time is proportional to the listed number of bytes of the file but is exaggerated.  
However, the directories and files are all fake: Names are chosen randomly from a list of 
all the Web page names at NPS, and contents of the accessible and readable files are 
generated by randomly choosing a picture and its caption from an NPS Web page.  The 
picture at the bottom of Figure 1 was allegedly the file /root/Code05/WAT/policy/ 
Old_pages/23_AdvancesNonPhotoRealisticRendering/Locations/NavalPostgraduate 
School/images/aries_thumbnail.html, which suggests that this Aries vehicle has 
something to do with photographic rendering, policy, and wide-area timesharing, none of 
which is true.  The site functions as a kind of "honeypot" for spies, encouraging them to 
find spurious connections between seemingly meaningful things, while the encryption 
and the authorization errors suggest hidden secrets. 
 
We also implemented a software tool MECOUNTER (Rowe, 2003) to systematically 
"counterplan" (Carbonell, 1981) or find ways to foil a computer-system attack plan.  This 
work is built on previous research in automated planning from constraints, and exploits a 
hierarchical and probabilistic attack model.  The model has two agents with different 
goals, an attacker and a computer system. To test our counterplanning, we tested it on a 
particular model we built for attacks that use buffer overflows to install rootkits.  This 
model is of a sufficiently high level to ignore details that change frequently between 
attacks such as the particular buffer-overflow method, but detailed enough to capture 
most details of situation-independent behavior.   It models nineteen action types which 
can be instantiated to ninety-three distinct actions.  The specifications cover a possible 
115 distinct facts (and their 115 negations) in states, preconditions, and goals, and allow 
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for thirteen categories of random occurrences with actions.   We defined for it 3072 test 
starting states for the goals of installing a rootkit on a system, installing gimmicked port-
management software, and logging out.   When no complicating random events occur, 
forty-eight steps are sufficient to achieve the goal from the most complex start state.  
 
Our approach to counterplanning is to first find all possible atomic "ploys" that can 
interfere with the plan.  Ploys are simple deceits the operating system can perform such 
as lying about the status of a file.  We analyze ploys as to the degree of difficulty they 
cause to the attack plan wherever they can be applied.  This is more complex than it 
seems because ploys may necessitate changes to more than one fact simultaneously.  For 
instance, if we add a fact that a file F on site S is compressed, we must add the fact that F 
is on S if that fact is not asserted already.  So for any proposed deletion or addition of a 
fact to a state, we must determine all implied facts and implied negations of facts.  We 
can infer that A implies B if whenever A occurs in a state, B also occurs.  We can infer 
that A implies not(B) if whenever A occurs in a state, B does not occur.  Such 
implications obey transitivity (if A implies B and B implies C, A implies C) and 
contrapositivity (if A implies B, then not(B) implies not(A)) which reduces their required 






Figure 1: Example from the fake file directory deception. 
 
examines the states resulting from a set of simulation runs of the planner and suggests 
implications. 
 
Several principles then can be used to prune possible ploys.  It makes no sense to apply a 
ploy to a state if the ploy is a normal plan action for that state.  Facts added by a ploy that 
are already true in a state, or facts deleted by a ploy that are already false in a state, can 
be ignored to simplify the ploy (or eliminate it if all changes are removed).  It is not 
generally possible to delete mental consequences of actions (such as human knowledge of 
particular vulnerability), though strenuous efforts at disinformation can sometimes work.  
It makes no sense to delete, add, or change an order with a ploy since computers are 
should be agents of human needs and this kind of deception is easily apparent.  Similarly, 
it makes no sense to delete a report since a human is expecting that report.  But false 
reports are useful ploys, either events that never occurred (like reporting that the network 
crashed) or events that occurred differently (like reporting that the network is slow when 
it is not); false reports eventually cause precondition violations and failure during 
execution of actions.  We assume a false report must relate to a precondition or 
postcondition of the preceding action.  For our rootkit-installation example after pruning, 
we found 588 implications, 16 fact-deletion ploys, 28 fact-addition ploys, and 16 ploys 
with both fact deletion and addition. 
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We then formulate a "counterplan" by selecting the most cost-effective set of ploys and 
assign appropriate presentation methods for them, taking into account the likelihood that, 
if we are not careful, the attacker will realize they are being deceived and will terminate 
our game with them.   The counterplan can be accomplished by a modified operating 
system.  An exhaustive approach to finding the best ploys for the counterplan is to 
systematically consider each one for each state, an analogy to approximating partial 
derivatives of a cost function.  The most troublesome ploy-state combinations for the 
attacker can be executed.  However, much of this exhaustive analysis is unnecessary.  We 
can collapse analysis of identical states in different runs, building a Markov state model 
with state-transition probabilities.  State equivalence can be qualitative to further reduce 
the possibilities.  We ran our rootkit-installation model 500 times (in about 700 minutes) 
with random starting states drawn from the set of 3072, the defined random 
postconditions, and durations defined by probability distributions (allowing that attacker 
and system can work in parallel) to get 10,276 distinct states in 21,720 total states, which 
cut our work in half.   A second efficiency idea is to infer good ploys from similar 
situations using inheritance and inheritance-like rules.  We devised useful rules for 
"backward temporal suitability inheritance", "downward fixplan inheritance", and "ploy 
fixplan following".  For our full example of rootkit installation with 500 simulation runs, 
there were 70 ploys for the 10,276 possible states, providing 616,560 ploy-to-state match 
possibilities.  Only 19,112 of these were needed for initial analysis, and temporal 
inheritance expanded this to 104,971.  Of these, only 18,835 (3.0%) were found 
meaningful and damaging to the attacker.  (The average fixplan needed 6.6 steps to return 
the attacker to a known state.)  Combining this data with the benefits of the Markov 
model, we reduced our counterplanning effort to 1.4% of the cost of an exhaustive test of 
changes to the simulation, without eliminating any useful possibilities. 
 
After promising ploys and their best times of application to the plan have been computed, 
we must choose a good set of them to comprise the counterplan.  Our benefit metric must 
reflect the results of numerous "red team" experiments that showed that well-trained and 
determined attackers usually eventually gained control of target computer systems.  So 
our only realistic objective is to delay the attacker maximally.  But we cannot just do this 
by implementing every ploy every time because the more ploys we use, the more likely 
the attacker will suspect they are being fooled.  Then the more likely the attacker will 
give up and log off, and we cannot then delay them further.  The simplest acceptable 
model of the expected benefit due to ploy i at state j in a counterplan we found was: 
))1)(1(())1(( 1,1, −−−−+ iiijijiijj apfmcegk ρρ  
where jk  is the frequency of the occurrence of state j in a randomly chosen complete 
attack plan; jg  is the probability that a user beginning an attack plan including j actually 
reaches state j (without being discouraged, etc.); ie  is the probability that ploy i succeeds; 
jic  is the expected time added to the plan by the ploy i at state j; ρ is the ratio of the 
value of a delay of one unit of  a legitimate user's time to the delay of one unit of an 
attacker's time; jim  is the probability the behavior observed so far is part of the attack 
plan for which the ploys were generated; f(x) is a sigmoid function between 0 and 1 (we 




occurring at random; 1,1, −iia  is the association probability between this ploy and the most-
similar previous one. 
 
We used a greedy search to choose the best set of ploys since it performed almost as well 
as branch-and-bound in test runs.  That is, we choose the best ploy-time pair, then the 
second best of the remaining ploy-time pairs after adjusting probabilities, then the third, 
and so on until expected ploy time delays no longer exceed a fixed threshold.  We use the 
same counterplan for each attack because consistency is important in deception.  We 
discovered with MECOUNTER analyzing the results of the 500 simulation runs that the 
best way to impede the root-compromise plan was to do 22 ploy-state combinations.  
These changes included some obvious ones (like faking general network problems and 
deleting the rootkit after the attacker has logged out) and less obvious ones (such as 
issuing false reports that the downloaded files are now recompressed).  In general, all 
ploys proposed by MECOUNTER were helpful and reasonable for defense of the system. 
 
Prototype design of an intrusion interception language CHAMELEON 
 
We also developed and implemented the first version of the rule language 
CHAMELEON (Michael, Fragkos, and Auguston, 2003) for experiments with software 
decoys in Red Hat Linux 6.2 environment.  The implementation is based on the Linux 
kernel wrapper tools developed by NAI (Ko et al, 2000).  This provides a more general 
approach to implementing deceptions in the form of a tool to systematically modify large 
software systems like operating systems. 
 
This first version of rule language provides functionality for signature-based intrusion 
detection and countermeasures, like delay or total blocking of kernel command 
execution, and error message generation.  Intrusion signatures can be specified as regular 
expressions over kernel subroutine calls and can involve also values of input and output 
parameters of kernel calls.  The CHAMELEON compiler takes the rule source code and 
generates wrapper code in the Wrapper Definition Language (WDL) in addition to a 
script file necessary to compile the WDL code into executable and install and activate the 
wrapper in the kernel space.  The Appendix shows the formal syntax of the language. 
 
Wrapper Support System (WSS) monitors install wrappers and creates a new instance of 
a wrapper for each process executed within the system.  Since event patterns can be 
accompanied by actions written in the C language, it becomes possible to program 
arbitrary countermeasures in response to the detected intrusion activities. 
 
As an example, the rule below detects a sequence of file operations, including opening 
the file, some read/write operations, and closing the file.  Each event will cause a 
message to be sent to the system-monitoring log file with the file name involved.  The 
pre and post options indicate whether the corresponding action is performed before or 
after the matching kernel call. $path is one of several predefined access variables that 




/* simple rule example */ 
     R1 : 
     detect    
 open pre   { wr_printf("open file %s", $path) ; }  
 (     read pre { wr_printf("read file %s ", $path); }   |  
    write pre {wr_printf("write file %s ", $path);}       ) * 
             close post { wr_printf( "file %s  closed", $path); } 
 
Besides executing arbitrary C code, the actions performed by wrapper rules may include 
two simple primitives: DENY, which will prevent execution of corresponding kernel call, 
and DELAY(N), which delays execution of kernel call by N milliseconds. 
 
The CHAMELEON framework supports signature-based intrusion detection and a basic 
countermeasures mechanism. Future work includes an extension to accommodate 
anomaly-based statistical methods for detecting system misuse.  One idea were are 
exploring is to use a third-party intrusion detection system that communicates with the 
wrappers (Monteiro, 2003), which appears a promising way to cut development costs 
dramatically.   
 
Run-time monitoring of Knowledge Temporal Logic specifications 
 
Another aspect of our research is modeling the time sequence of events in deceptions and 
attempts to foil them.  We have found temporal logic quite useful.  (Pnueli, 1977) 
suggested using Linear-Time Propositional Temporal Logic (LTL) for reasoning about 
concurrent programs.  LTL is an extension of propositional logic where, in addition to the 
well-known propositional logic operators, there are four future-time operators (◊-
Eventually,  -Always, U-Until, Ο-Next) and four dual past-time operators.  (Fagin et al, 
1995) developed a general framework for modeling knowledge and computation and 
apply it towards reasoning about knowledge in distributed systems.  This framework, 
which we refer to as knowledge logic, is based on propositional modal logic.  
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A card-game example was introduced in (Fagin et al, 1995).  It consists of  two players (1 
and 2) and three cards (A, B and C).  Each player takes one card and the third card is left 
face down on the table. A possible world is described in the formal model by the cards 
that the players hold. If player 1 holds A and player 2 holds B we denote the world as (A, 
B).  Hence there are six possible worlds (A, B), (A, C), (B, A), (B, C), (C, A) and (C, B). 
Now if the player 1 has card C then he clearly thinks that there are two possible worlds,  
one where player 2 holds card A and in the other where player 2 holds card B.  The 























Run-time Monitoring of KTL 
 
Run time Execution Monitoring (REM) is a class of methods of tracking temporal 
requirements for an underlying application.  Of particular interest are on-line REM 
methods where temporal rules are evaluated without storing an ever growing and 
potentially unbounded history trace.  (Drusinsky, 2000) and (Drusinsky and Shing, 2003)  
describe the DBRover and Temporal Rover REM tools.  These tools support REM and 
simulation of properties written in LTL (future-time and past-time) with counting 
operators, as well as real-time and time-series constraints.  We have extended the 
specification language used by these tools with two new operators, knows (K) and 
believes (B).  In addition, the user specifies a possible worlds model, such as in Figure 2, 
using an XML knowledge file.  The Rover tools assume that agent relations, such as the 
Figure 2 relation (<C,B>,<C,A>, player-1), is transitive.  The end user can select whether 
agent’s relation is reflexive and symmetric, though we have only experimented with a full 







1 1 2 
2 2 
Figure 2: Kripke model for the card game. 
<WORLD NAME="AB">  
<PL CODE="player1HasA" TRUTH="1" />  
<PL CODE="player1HasB" TRUTH="0" />  
<PL CODE="player1HasC" TRUTH="0" />  
<PL CODE="player2HasA" TRUTH="0" />  
<PL CODE="player2HasB" TRUTH="1" />  
<PL CODE="player2HasC" TRUTH="0" />  
Figure 3: Representation of the world AB in the card games’ knowledge file. 
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Consider the KTL rule for the card game: R1=◊≤3K1K2 ≤2{player1HasCardB ∨ 
player1HasCardC}, i.e., R1 states that within three cycles player-1 will know that player-
2 knows that for two consecutive cycles player-1 has card B or C.   When the Rover tools 
monitor rule R1 they repeatedly read a stream of propositional statements about the status 
of each player. In the implementation of the card game demo we chose to represent each 
such reading as a 6-tuple <player1HasCardA, player1HasCardB… player2HasCardC>; 
the reading of a new tuple constitutes a cycle from the temporal perspective.  The domain 
of propositions in the input stream (six propositions in our case) and the domain of 
propositions in the possible worlds model are related by knowledge file which assigns a 
truth value to propositions in each world. Listing 1 contains the specification of the world 
AB in knowledge file for the card game. 
 
Consider the following sequence of readings (i.e., cycles), where XY represents the world 
where player-1 has card X and player-2 has card Y: σ=AB.AC.BC.BA.  Consider for 
example world AB, which is the world of cycle 0.  Using the possible worlds model of 
[FHMV], AB |- K1 ρ if ρ holds in all worlds that are equivalent to AB for player-1, i.e., in 
worlds AB and AC. AB |- ρ i.e., AB |- K2 ϕ if ϕ holds in all worlds that are equivalent to 
AB for player-2, i.e., in worlds AB and CB. However, player1HasCardB ∨ 
player1HasCardC is not true in world AB.  Hence the monitoring result for R1 in cycle 0 
is false. Consider the world for cycle 2, namely BC. ρ= K2 ϕ must hold in both (i) BC and 
(ii) BA. For (i) ϕ must hold in BC and AC, and for (ii) ϕ must hold in BA and CA.  One of 
those four worlds, AC, does not satisfy player1HasCardB ∨ player1HasCardC resulting 
for R1 in cycle 2 is false. 
 
Consider the slightly modified rule R2=◊≤3B1K2 ≤2{player1HasCardB ∨ 
player1HasCardC}.  Using the same input sequence σ, we examine R2 for the world for 
cycle 2, namely BC. ρ= K2 ϕ must hold in either (i) BC or (ii) BA, where (i) and (ii) are 
described above; case (ii) holds in cycle 2.  The world for cycle 3 is BA where ρ= K2 ϕ 
must hold in either (i) BC or (ii) BA, which is identical to cycle 2.  Hence, ρ holds for two 
consecutive cycles starting in cycle 2; therefore R2 is true. 
 
Modeling the WWII "Man Who Never Was" Deception Ploy 
 
Let us apply this to a classic military example from (Dunnigan and Nofi, 2001).  In the 
spring of 1943 the Allies began to consider options for the invasion of Europe.  
Strategically located in the Mediterranean, Sicily was a good target.  However, due to 
various obstacles facing the Allied command it was decided to not invade Sicily but 
rather to form a complete set of fake plans for another invasion site and time and then 
convince the Germans of this plan.   A plan named “Operation Mincemeat," was created 
in which a British spy would be “captured” with the false documents.  This spy was 
Major Martin, a corpse.  Martin was provided with false papers in a briefcase attached to 
his body to give a false view of when and where the invasion would occur.  A 30-year-
old pneumonia victim who had recently died and who resembled a typical staff officer 
was chosen as Major Martin.  The fluid in his lungs would suggest that he had been at sea 
for an extended period.  Fake love letters, overdue bills, and a letter from the Major’s 
father, and some personal belongings were put on his corpse.  Martin’s obituary was in 
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the British papers, and his name appeared on casualty lists.  Major Martin was taken to a 
point just off the coast of Spain where the Allies knew the most efficient German military 
intelligence network was in place, put in a life jacket, and set adrift.  The body soon 
washed ashore practically at the feet of a Spanish officer conducting routine coastal 
defense drills. He notified the proper authorities, which notified the Germans.  On the 
return of Major Martin’s body to England, they discovered that his briefcase had been 
very carefully opened, then resealed.  The Germans had photographed every document on 
Martin’s body and in his briefcase, then released him to the Spanish authorities for return 
to England, for the English authorities had been demanding return of Martin’s body.  One 
additional less known fact is that during the time that the leading German coroner was in 
Spain during when the Spanish found Martin’s body.  The German coroner was capable 
of uncovering the real cause of death, Pneumonia.  However, as it happened the dots were 
not connected and this coroner did not examine Major Martin’s body. 
 
The logic representation of the "Man who never was" deception ploy is concerned with 
all possible worlds seen by the three agents, the British, the Germans, and the Spanish.  
We define the following three Boolean propositions, which together induce a space of 
eight possible worlds: 
 
H- represents possible worlds where Major Martin episode is a deception. 
G- represents possible worlds where the German coroner is in Spain and is working on 
the case. 

















Hence, for example, w1 = <H, ¬G, ¬M> is the possible world where the Major Martin 
episode is a deception, the German coroner is not in Spain, and Major Martin did not 
drown.  This is the possible world the British considered they were in, but in fact, they 
were unable to distinguish between this world and w2 = <H, G, ¬M> and could have 
very well been in world w2.  As in the card example of Figure 2, KL relations are used to 
aggregate worlds an agent is unable to distinguish.  Figure 4 illustrates the KL model for 






H, ¬G, ¬M 
¬H, ¬G,M 












Figure 4: The KL model for the "Man who never was" ploy, where B=British, 
D=German, S=Spanish. 
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Deception and the law 
 
Response to attacks 
 
In addition to the technical aspects of realizing cyber-based deceptions, we are 
investigating social aspects, in particular those relating to conducting deception within 
the confines of the law.  For instance, (Michael, Wingfield, and Wijesekera 2003) 
demonstrated how the Schmitt Analysis (Schmitt, 1998) can be used to perform an 
academically rigorous evaluation of the factors affecting a lawful response to a terrorist 
attack, regardless of whether the attack is effected via kinetic or cyber means.  Schmitt 
Analysis is not intended to provide a mechanical algorithm for solving what are some of 
the most technically and legally challenging questions we face; instead, it is designed to 
be a useful framework for analyzing the effect of key factors on the legal nature of an 
attack and the appropriate response.  As such, it provides an invaluable tool for clarifying 
thought and highlighting areas of misunderstanding or disagreement.  Further, it is an 
excellent basis for training lawyers, technologists, and decision makers in government.  
Finally, Schmitt’s methodology shows the way for parallel efforts to make more rigorous 
and more transparent the legal analyses in neighboring areas. 
 
Misuse of deception 
 
Cyber decoys provide a means for automating, to a degree, counterintelligence activities 
and responses to cyber-attacks.  Like other security mechanisms for protecting 
information systems, it is likely that cyber decoys will in some instances be misused.  In 
the United States, criminal law provides us with analogies for preventing or punishing 
improper state use of deception, and criminal and civil law give us a range of tools to use 
against private actors.  However, in addition to states, nongovernmental entities and 
individuals can employ cyber decoys.  (Michael and Wingfield, 2003) presented a 
principled analysis of the use of cyber decoys, in which they explored the absolute 
minima in terms of customary principles for what might be considered to be acceptable 
use of deception. 
 
According to (Michael and Wingfield, 2003), software decoys can be used as an airlock 
between the technology and the law in that the decoys can be programmed with a wide 
spectrum of options for taking action.  Software decoys provide for anticipatory 
exception handling.  In other words, the decoy anticipates the types of inappropriate 
interaction between itself and processes or objects requesting its services, providing in 
advance a set of rules for learning about and evaluating the nature of the interaction, in 
addition to rules for response.  One could envision developing policy that places 
boundaries on the extent and type of deception to be employed, but providing some 
degree of latitude to the user of decoys to inject creativity into deceptions so as to 
increase the likelihood that the deceptions will be effective.  The boundaries could be 
used to delineate the thresholds that if breached could result in the misuse or unlawful use 
of decoys.  That is, principled analysis can be used to meet all domestic legal criteria, and 
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set absolute minima in terms of the four customary principles of discrimination, 
necessity, proportionality, and chivalry. 
 
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security will be responsible for coordinating the 
protection of both public and private cybernetic property using cyber weapons.  There are 
gray areas in the law regarding how to coordinate counterintelligence activities and 
countermeasures that need to take place at the intersection of law enforcement, in-
telligence collection, and military activity.  Principled analysis can help here too, but 
public policymakers will need technically and legally sophisticated advice to manage the 
best technological defense, including deception techniques, available within the frame-
work of the law. 
 
Tools and support for education 
 
We have been working from two different but complimentary areas: lawful use of 
software-based deception (Michael and Wingfield, 2003), and cyber law (Wingfield, 
2000).  To this end, we are developing case studies, with the aid of some automated tools, 
to teach officials from the law enforcement, intelligence, and military communities how 
to reason about the legality of responses to terrorist attacks.  With appropriate training, 
information, and analysis (both automated and with man-in-the-loop), it will be possible 
to reduce the “gray area” of legal uncertainty to a minimum, and allow the most complete 
range of effective responses against those who attack a nation’s critical infrastructure. 
 
(Farkas et al., 2004) reports development of THEMIS, the Threat Evaluation Metamodel 
for Information Systems.  THEMIS is a description logic-based framework to apply state, 
federal, and international law to reason about the intent, with respect to collateral 
consequences, of computer network attacks. The purpose THEMIS is intended to serve is 
to provide law enforcement agencies and prosecutors with automated tools for building 
legally credible arguments, and for network designers to keep their defensive and 
retaliatory measures—including the use of deception mechanisms—within lawful limits.  
THEMIS automates known quantitative measures of characterizing attacks, weighs their 
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Appendix: The syntax of CHAMELEON rule language 
 
Rule::=  Rule_name  ':' detect  Event_sequence 
 
Event_sequence::=   (+ Event_pattern  +) | 
   '(' Event_sequence ')' [ ( '*' ! '+' ! '?') ]  | 
   '('   Event_sequence  (  '|'  Event_sequence  )+   ')' 
 
Event_pattern::=  Event_type [ probe Condition ] [ pre   Actions ] [ post  Actions ] 
 
Condition::=  '('  C_expression  ')' 
 
Actions::=  '{'  Action *  '}' 
 
Action::= DENY |  DELAY '(' number_of_msec ')'  |  C_operator 
 
Event_type::=   ANY |  kernel_subroutine_name 
 
Rule_name  ::=  identifier 
  
Notes. 
Conditions and actions may include references to the kernel call parameters, like $path 
Current wrapper system can monitor approx. 150 kernel subroutine names 
Actions can be performed just before (pre) or after (post) the detected event 
The probe condition provides for additional context checking when the event is detected  
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